There will never be a lab test for some mental health disorders

Because they aren’t really “disorders” when you consider the “symptoms” in context.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

USMC-050124-N-1810F-562

One of the first things any new student in family therapy learns about is the genius of the acting-out child. Children are keen observers of the world around them: If they learn that one kind of scream or cry or tantrum gets their parents’ attention where another kind does not, they are quick to do what works and give up on what doesn’t.

Children are also, for obvious reasons, incredibly observant of their parents’ relationship (whether to each other, or in blended or single-parent families, to the new partner). For kids, seeing their parents fighting can be utterly terrifying.

Some kids, in the midst of a parental argument, learn to stay out of the way. Other kids learn, even by accident, that a very good way to get the parents to stop arguing with each other is to break rules, scream, or otherwise behave inappropriately. Here is where acting out is so smart: if both parents get angry at the kid for misbehaving, at least they stop arguing with each other for a while.

For a child, the pain of having your parents angry at you may be far preferable to the terror experienced when watching them fight each other.

Of course, parents are often reluctant to see this. They may instead perceive such a child as “hard to handle,” “defiant,” or otherwise broken. In the worst cases, health care professionals buy into the parents’ descriptions, slapping diagnostic labels on the child. Labels like “attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder” or “oppositional defiant disorder” may accurately describe a child’s behavior, but they ignore the cause, and tend to focus attention on the child as the problem.

A skillful family therapist will assess not just the child but also the child’s entire social environment, including their family, to see whether the acting-out behavior is actually smart. If it is, then therapy focuses not on “curing” the acting out, but instead on making it no longer necessary. The family therapy field is rife with stories of children diagnosed with attention-deficit disorder, childhood bipolar disorder, or other mental illnesses who are rapidly “cured” once their parents start coming in to therapy sessions — especially if the parents are willing to work on their relationship with each other.)

Of course, we don’t stop being impacted by our social worlds when we become adults. Just as the acting-out child is often behaving in a way that is quite smart given their environment, adults who appear to have mental illnesses may be responding intelligently to the world around them. This may mean their behavior is a response to the work environment, social circle, family, or even larger society. For example, William Glasser suggests that at least some of the higher prevalence of depression among women might actually be a wise response to the impossibly high demands placed on women to be successful at work, at home, and socially, always with a smile on. For women who experience that pressure intensely, and do not feel they have a reasonable way of escaping or easing it, depression can be a quite reasonable way of checking out of that chase without having to actively fight social norms. (For clarity, Glasser is not suggesting blaming the depressed for their depression; he does argue that depressive behaviors are sometimes chosen, but goes on to say these choices are often not conscious. Depression may be an adaptive response to difficult circumstances, Glasser says, but it certainly is not ideal.)

Ultimately, whether we are talking about children, adolescents, or adults, it is often true that behavior that might look troubling or even “ill” in one context is actually quite helpful in another. In fact, sometimes taking on behaviors that appear crazy to others is actually the smartest thing to do. It’s evidence of good health and adaptability, not an underlying problem with the brain or body that any lab test could detect.

That’s why, for as much as I support the National Institutes of Mental Health’s effort to usher in a new era of hard science in mental health diagnosis (and usher out the behavior-based diagnoses of the DSM-5), I wonder who it will leave out in the cold. The simple fact is that many people who now (appropriately!) receive diagnoses and are eligible for insurance-covered treatment for mental disorders are not, in any physiologically-testable way, disordered. They are actually quite healthy. Their behavior makes perfect sense when understood in context.

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Your comments are welcomed. You can post them in the comments below, by email to ben[at]bencaldwell[dot]com, or on my Twitter feed.

National Institutes of Mental Health abandons DSM-5

Just weeks before the new diagnostic manual is released, NIMH cites “lack of validity” and says “patients with mental disorders deserve better.”
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

PET-imageIn a surprising announcement just weeks before the scheduled release of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), the US government’s mental health research arm has announced plans to stop using DSM categories in its work.

The National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) is the single largest funder of mental health research in the world. In his announcement last week explaining the decision, NIMH Director Thomas Insel wrote that “Symptoms alone rarely indicate the best choice of treatment.” While diagnositic categories based on clusters of symptoms — like the categories in the DSM — provide a common language that mental health care providers and researchers can use, these categories are more about that consistency in usage (i.e., reliability) than they are about clinical or research validity. Such symptom-based diagnosis, Insel argued, is now outdated in most other areas of medicine.

So NIMH is scrapping DSM categories when funding future research and is developing its own framework to “transform diagnosis by incorporating genetics, imaging [such as the PET scan pictured above], cognitive science, and other levels of information to lay the foundation for a new classification system,” according to Insel. For now, the new classification system is just a framework for research. But the clear intention is to make the DSM obsolete.

As a family therapist, I find the DSM-5 categories to be both useful and limited in the ways Insel described. They are a good tool for communicating with other professionals, but not especially useful for clients, beyond establishing that others may have similar suffering. I like the idea of a new classification system for mental disorders based on biology and verifiable laboratory tests (indeed, I think it’s overdue), and think it quite likely that such a system will strongly support systemic and relational therapies. The brain is a social organ, after all, and therapy creates verifiable physiological changes in the brain.

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Your comments are welcomed. You can post them in the comments below, by email to ben[at]bencaldwell[dot]com, or on my Twitter feed.

Washington, Texas, Arizona, Michigan weighing “conscience clause” laws

Far-reaching laws would appear to place therapists’ religious values above anti-discrimination rules.

The Washington State Capitol
The states of Washington, Texas, Arizona, and Michigan have joined a growing list of states considering so-called “conscience clause” legislation, that would allow health care providers (including therapists) to refuse to treat specific types of clients based on the therapist’s religious beliefs. Kansas governor Sam Brownback signed such bill into law in March, and a Kentucky bill was passed into law earlier this year through an override of the Governor’s veto.

While some states have designed such bills specifically for health care settings, most of the recent conscience clause bills apply to all work settings that require state licensure or other involvement of state government. They use language very similar to that of the successful Kentucky bill:

“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s freedom of religion. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief may not be substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to further that interest. A ‘burden’ shall include indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion from programs or access to facilities.”

As I mentioned in my earlier discussion of the Kentucky law, such language in any state would make it exceedingly difficult for marriage and family therapy graduate programs (if they receive state funding) to discipline or expel students who plainly state their intent to discriminate when providing therapy services. It would also mean that state licensure boards would have a high burden when attempting to discipline the license of a therapist who was discriminatory in their practice.

While written to protect religious freedom in broad terms, it can be argued that these laws are emerging with a more specific, if not directly spoken, purpose in mind: to allow religious business owners and health care providers to freely discriminate against gay and lesbian clients. That has certainly been a concern with the Kentucky religious freedom law. The Washington law, meanwhile, arose in response to a consumer protection lawsuit that the state’s Attorney General filed against a florist who had refused to provide flowers for a gay couple’s wedding (same-sex marriage is legal in Washington). The lawsuit argued that the florist, who cited religion in refusing to serve the couple, was illegally discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.

The text of the proposed conscience clause legislation in Washington makes the target of the law clear once you know what the bolded language here means (emphasis added):

Nothing in this section may burden a person or religious organization’s freedom of religion including, but not limited to, the right of an individual or entity to deny services if providing those goods or services would be contrary to the individual’s or entity owner’s sincerely held religious beliefs, philosophical beliefs, or matters of conscience. This subsection does not apply to the denial of services to individuals recognized as a protected class under federal law applicable to the state as of the effective date of this section. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, philosophical belief, or matter of conscience may not be burdened unless the government proves that it has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to further that interest.

Federal law currently prohibits discrimination against a variety of protected classes. Discrimination based on race, gender, disability, or nationality is prohibited under federal law, for example. But gays and lesbians are not a protected class in federal law. So the main impact of this bill would be to allow discrimination, based on religious belief or matters of conscience, against gay and lesbian clients.

Still, the broad wording of these laws allows for much farther-reaching impact. A commentary on the Washington proposal in the (Salem, OR) Statesman-Journal suggests that it could revive religious objections to mixed-race couples. The group Americans United for Separation of Church and State describes other acts that these bills appear to legalize:

A pharmacist could refuse to provide Plan B drugs to a rape victim. The owner of an apartment building could refuse to rent to an unmarried couple.

These examples and more can be applied to therapists and their clients, with the therapist either as discriminator or victim. A therapist under these laws may refuse to treat gay and lesbian clients. In states that leave out the federal law stipulation that Washington included, that therapist may also refuse to treat Mexicans, or Mormons, or any other group they see fit to turn away. Therapists working at hospitals, in group practices, or in other settings as employees might also be discriminated against at the moral whim of their employers, who would be able to summarily fire therapists who have premarital sex (or who don’t, if the employer decides that their personal morals favor premarital sex), or who identify as gay or lesbian. Each of these would be of questionable legality even under the new laws, because of the potentially overriding impact of federal anti-discrimination law, but they would appear to be clearly illegal in most instances under current law. Bringing the legality of such acts into question — inviting lawsuits to sort out the underlying issues, and placing a high burden on the state to justify any restriction of acts of morality or conscience — seems to be the idea.

Ultimately, if these and similar laws continue to pass around the country, the non-discrimination clause in the AAMFT Code of Ethics may best be considered moot. Any therapist with moral or religious beliefs that declare some people to be unequal could freely discriminate on the basis of race, gender, nationality, or any other basis without fear of any repercussions against their license. AAMFT could still act on an ethics complaint, even removing a therapist from the association. But the therapist would never need to inform clients that the complaint had happened, and could freely continue in practice as the state could not discipline their license.

Bills similar to the ones enacted in Kansas and Kentucky, and proposed in Washington and Tennessee, are now pending in several other states:

  • In Texas, a religious-freedom act already exists in state law, but Texas Senate Joint Resolution 4 would make that law part of the state Constitution.
  • Nevada Senate Bill 192 is similarly broad and has advanced through the Senate to the state Assembly.
  • In Arizona, Senate Bill 1178 has been amended from a bill on long-term disability into a broad religious-freedom measure.
  • And in Michigan, where religious-freedom legislation proposed in response to the Julea Ward case failed last year, a broader bill on religious freedom in health care (Michigan Senate Bill 136) is making progress. Among other changes, the Michigan bill would (quoting a Senate Committee Analysis) “Prohibit an employer from penalizing a health provider and prohibit a university, college, or educational institution from refusing admission to an individual or penalizing a student or member of its faculty or staff for expressing a conscientious objection or requesting an accommodation to avoid participating in a health care service.”

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Your comments are welcome. Post in the comments section below, by email to ben[at]bencaldwell.com, or through my Twitter feed.

Updated: BBS legal opinion improves, doesn’t fix, child abuse reporting issue

California mandated child abuse reporters would no longer need to discriminate against gay or lesbian youth. But the legal opinion is just that: An opinion.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

A legal opinion announced on Thursday by the California Board of Behavioral Sciences appears to go partway to resolving the problem of discriminatory reporting of child abuse.

The opinion, prepared at BBS request by legal counsel for the Department of Consumer Affairs, essentially says that oral sex, anal sex, and object penetration should be treated the same as vaginal intercourse when considering abuse reporting. If two minors of similar ages (as defined by the law; see the age combination descriptions in this earlier post) engage in consensual acts without evidence of coercion or other signs of abuse, those acts are not reportable.

BBS Executive Director Kim Madsen announced at Thursday’s Policy and Advocacy Committee meeting that she would make the full legal opinion public. While the opinion does not carry the weight of law, it should be helpful for therapists seeking to understand when the BBS expects child abuse reports to be made, and when the therapist can rely on their own judgment as to what is abusive.

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Your comments are welcomed. You can post them in the comments below, by email to ben[at]bencaldwell[dot]com, or on my Twitter feed.

Relationship education: Scott Stanley responds

Stanley, one of the developers of the popular PREP program, offers a more optimistic view of the Building Strong Families study’s Oklahoma City data.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

People in Bad MergentheimI posted last week about the disappointing 3-year results of the Building Strong Families study, a major study of relationship education involving more than 5,000 families at nine sites around the country.

Scott Stanley, one of the developers of the PREP relationship education course and a (quite deservedly) well-respected name in relationship and marriage research, wrote me in response, offering a more optimistic look at the site-specific data from the study’s Oklahoma City location. He kindly granted permission for me to post his letter, in its entirety, here. The emphasis added is mine and I’ve plugged in some links, but otherwise left his writing unchanged:

Dear Ben,

Just read your post on BSF in OK. You raise important points like those raised by others.

I wanted to argue the other side a bit, particularly about the Oklahoma finding at 36 months in the BSF study. I won’t take the space to do it fully in this comment, but I would refer your readers to a blog post I did on the 36 month findings in light of a similar critique by Andrew Cherlin in the last week of 2012. The piece (my blog piece) links to Cherlin’s critique and several other interesting pieces that your readers may appreciate. Andrew Cherlin has read my piece on his critique, and I believe he has changed his mind about the importance of the stability finding in OK at 3 years out. (see links here and below)

The key point is simply this: As I explain in my piece, what you refer to a small difference in family stability is actually a 20% increase in family stability for these most vulnerable families 3 years later (49% in the program group vs. 41% in the control group, of families where the children born lived continuously with both parents over the three year follow-up period, which is a 20% improvement of the intervention group over the control group).

What you, as so many others, are likely unaware of is that the evidence for most government social programs (or other programs for that matter) is dismal (I also make this point in my piece). I give some suggestions for how people can look such things up in my piece as well.

This OK BSF finding is actually rather extraordinary, and it is unlike findings in most all evaluations of government programs, especially evaluations of initial efforts–it is significant, relatively large (this is not a small difference on such an outcome in a policy study), and it is on what is easily argued the single most important type indicator relevant to this study context and family policy. It is also not at all unusual to get earlier impacts on things that can change more immediately that may (as in this case) set up longer term, more important outcomes.

You may not be impressed with that finding, but there are those who know government evaluations quite well who find it remarkable. However, it is true that among people who have been critics of these fledgling efforts, the desire has clearly mostly been to focus on the pooled results across sites where the story is not positive.

In addition to the points I make in my blog in commenting on Andrew Cherlin’s piece, I would add these points here about the finding you dismiss: This impact on a hard indicator of an outcome (family stability) of prime interest three years after the intervention (1) happened in the only program to deliver a substantial dose of intervention to a high percentage of couples in the intervention group, (2) happened in the only program to have many significant impacts on relationship quality variables at the intermediate stage of evaluation, and (3) happened in the only site that also had a stability findings at the prior time point.

The link to my comment on Andrew Cherlin’s piece is here:
http://slidingvsdeciding.blogspot.com/2013/01/family-stability-and-relationship.html
[There is also a full disclosure comment at the end of that blog piece.]

The link to a resent presentation where you can see Andrew Cherlin’s comment on the OK finding is here:
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/03/20-knot-yet-marriage#ref-id=20130320_CCF_fullevent_pt1

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My thanks to Dr. Stanley for his thoughtful email and the permission to repost it here.

Your questions and comments are similarly welcomed. You can post them in the comments below, by email to ben[at]bencaldwell[dot]com, or on my Twitter feed.